1/25/19

"THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS" Our Glorious High Priest (8:1-6) by Mark Copeland


 "THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS"

 Our Glorious High Priest (8:1-6)
INTRODUCTION

1. With the beginning of chapter eight, we come to the close of the 
  first major section of "The Epistle To The Hebrews"...
   a. In which the key thought is "The Superiority of Christ"
   b. In which Jesus is shown to be superior to:
      1) To the prophets - He 1:1-3
      2) To angels - He 1:4-2:18
      3) To Moses - He 3:1-5
      4) To Aaron and his Levitical priesthood - He 5:1-10; 7:1-28

2. The next major section really begins in earnest with verse 7...
   a. In which the key thought will be "The Superiority of the New Covenant"
   b. In which this covenant is shown to be based upon:
      1) Better promises - He 8:7-13
      2) A better sanctuary - He 9:1-28
      3) A better sacrifice - He 10:1-18

3. In He 8:1-6, we find a transition...
   a. In which the main point of the first section is summarized
   b. In which the main points of the next section are introduced
   -- Indeed, these six verses truly summarize what the author seeks to
      establish in the first ten chapters of this epistle!

4. It can all be summarized in these words:  "We have such a High Priest..."
   a. In Jesus, we have a High Priest
   b. Not just any High Priest, but "such" a High Priest; i.e., a 
      glorious High Priest!

[In what ways is Jesus "Our Glorious High Priest"?  First, He is...]

I. SEATED AT THE RIGHT HAND OF GOD (1)

   A. THE PHRASE "THE MAJESTY IN THE HEAVENS"...
      1. A Jewish circumlocution meaning "God" (Believers' Study Bible)
      2. I.e., a roundabout way of referring to God - cf. He 1:3

   B. MANY PASSAGES REFER TO JESUS AT GOD'S RIGHT HAND...
      1. David prophesied that the Messiah would sit at God's right 
         hand - Ps 110:1
      2. Jesus said that He would sit at the right hand of God - Mk 14:60-62
      3. When He ascended to heaven, He then sat down at God's right 
         hand - Mk 16:19; He 12:2
      4. At God's right hand, He poured forth the Holy Spirit - Ac 2:33
      5. Peter preached Jesus as being exalted to be at God's right 
         hand as our Prince and Savior - Ac 5:30-31
      6. Paul taught that Jesus is at God's right hand, interceding for us - Ro 8:34
      7. He is at God's right hand, "waiting till His enemies are made
         His footstool" - He 10:12-13
      8. Yet while He sits and waits, He rules! - Ps 110:1-2,5; cf. 1Co 15:24-26
      9. For at God's right hand, He is above all other authority 
         - Ep 1:20-22; 1Pe 3:22
      -- In one place, we read of Jesus "standing at the right hand of
         God" (Ac 7:55-56); was Jesus showing His respect for Stephen,
         the first Christian martyr?
          
[Exalted to such a place of honor and authority, we truly have a 
"glorious" High Priest, one who is "the ruler over the kings of the 
earth" (Re 1:5)! As we look at the next verse in our text, we see
that He is also...]

II. A MINISTER OF THE TRUE TABERNACLE (2-5)

   A. ERECTED BY GOD, NOT MAN...
      1. We are now introduced to a contrast between two "tabernacles"
         a. There had been the earthly sanctuary or tabernacle
            1) As ordained under the first covenant (i.e., the Law) - cf. He 9:1ff
            2) It was built by man
         b. But now we read of one "which the Lord erected"; i.e., a
            heavenly tabernacle
      2. The heavenly tabernacle is none other than heaven itself! 
         - cf. He 9:11-12; 23-24

   B. IN WHICH HE OFFERS "SERVICE"...
      1. As a High Priest, it is necessary for Him to have something to offer - He 8:3
         a. Every high priest is appointed for this purpose - He 5:1
         b. What Jesus has to offer is not mention here, but will be later - cf. He 9:12
      2. This service He renders in heaven, not on the earth - He 8:4
         a. If He were on earth, He couldn't be a priest!
         b. For the Law required priests from the tribe of Levi, and 
            Jesus was from Judah
      3. As for priests on the earth...
         a. They serve only the copy and shadow of the heavenly things - He 8:5
         b. For Moses had been told by God to build the earthly 
            tabernacle according to pattern shown to him on the 
            mountain - cf. Exo 25:40

[As "Our Glorious High Priest", then, Jesus renders service in the 
true tabernacle, which is heaven itself.  This thought will be expanded
upon in chapters nine and ten.  But consider also how He is...]

III. THE MEDIATOR OF A BETTER COVENANT (6)

   A. HE HAS OBTAINED A MORE EXCELLENT MINISTRY...
      1. In contrast with the ministry of the Levitical priests
      2. Their ministry was simply a shadow and copy of His ministry 
         - cf. Col 2:16-17

   B. AS MEDIATOR OF A BETTER COVENANT...
      1. The word "mediator"...
         a. The Greek is "mesites" {mes-ee'-tace}
         b. It means "one who intervenes between two, either in order
            to make or restore peace and friendship, or form a compact,
            or for ratifying a covenant"
      2. By His death on the cross, Jesus has become the Mediator of 
         the new covenant  - cf. He 9:15; 12:24
      3. This new covenant is here referred to as "a better covenant"
         a. Better than what?  Better than the "first covenant" - cf. He 8:7
         b. I.e., what had been established through Moses

   C. ESTABLISHED ON BETTER PROMISES...
      1. What makes the new covenant better than the old are its promises
      2. Some of those promises are explained later - cf. He 8:10-12
      3. But Peter describes the promises we receive as "exceedingly
         great and precious promises" - cf. 2Pe 1:3-4

CONCLUSION

1. With this transition passage, then, we are introduced to things that
   will be expounded upon as we proceed through the epistle...
   a. The better covenant we have in Christ, based upon its better promises
   b. The better ministry Christ renders as our High Priest in heaven,
      seated at God's right hand

2. When such things are properly understood, we can see how Jesus is 
   truly "Our Glorious High Priest"!
   a. One who stands ready to minister in our behalf
   b. He is "able to save to the uttermost those who come to God 
      through Him" - He 7:25
   c. He is "able to aid those who are tempted" - He 2:18

Have you accepted Jesus as your High Priest by obeying His gospel?  He is truly...

   "...the author of eternal salvation to all who obey Him." (He 5:9)

For those who have not obeyed His gospel, we find this awesome warning:

   "...and to give you who are troubled rest with us when the Lord
   Jesus is revealed from heaven with His mighty angels, in flaming
   fire taking vengeance on those who do not know God, and on those
   WHO DO NOT OBEY THE GOSPEL OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST.  These shall
   be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the
   Lord and from the glory of His power..." (2Th 1:7-9)

Please render obedience to the gospel today if you have not yet done 
so! - cf. Ac 2:36-39

Executable Outlines, Copyright © Mark A. Copeland, 2016

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A Leap Into the Dark? by Eric Lyons, M.Min.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=558


A Leap Into the Dark?

by Eric Lyons, M.Min.


One of the most abused verses in all of Scripture is 2 Corinthians 5:7: “For we walk by faith, not by sight.” Often, those who “expound” upon the apostle Paul’s statement explain that faith implies something less than knowledge—that is, they teach that we must accept evidence blindly and take a “leap of faith.” Many so-called teachers and preachers, when commenting on 2 Corinthians 5:7, argue for a separation of faith and facts. German theologian Hans Kung upheld this idea of “biblical” faith when he wrote: “Even in faith, then, there is no certainty entirely free from doubt. In faith, we must commit ourselves to something uncertain” (1980, p. 61). Similar to Kung’s ideas about faith is the statement of televangelist Robert Schuller, who suggested: “Faith is a commitment to an unprovable assumption” (1984). If these men are correct, faith is either something based on no proof at all or something composed of a small amount of knowledge and a big dose of uncertainty that allows men to “act like” they know something when, in fact, they do not. Is this the kind of faith to which Paul was referring when he wrote his second epistle to the Corinthians?

Second Corinthians 5:7 is both amplified and clarified by verse 16 of that same chapter: “Therefore, from now on, we regard no one according to the flesh. Even though we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know Him thus no longer.” In other words, in the past Jesus had been present in the flesh, and hence could be known by sight. But, at the time Paul wrote his letters to the Corinthians, the situation had changed—Christ no longer was on the Earth. Thus, the apostle Paul clarified his statement about not walking “by sight” with the phrase “now we know Him thus no longer.” Of course, Christ still could be known, but not “after the flesh.” Had Paul written 2 Corinthians while Christ still was living upon the Earth, these passages (5:7,16) never would have been included among his remarks. But since they were written at some point after Christ’s ascension, Paul therefore was compelled to make the comparison he did in 2 Corinthians 5:7.
His point, quite simply, was this. There was a time when faith and sight went together. That is to say, at one time in history, men walked by faith because of sight (cf. John 4:41; 20:25-29). However, eventually followers of Jesus possessed a faith in Him that was not based upon sight, but instead upon such things as credible testimony, deduction, and revelation. Jesus indicated His approval of those whose faith is based upon knowledge gained in ways other than by sight when he told “doubting” Thomas: “Because you have seen Me, you have believed. Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed” (John 20:29).

Today, Christians can have a genuine faith without sight, thanks to such things as credible testimony from reliable eyewitnesses (such as Peter, James, John, and Paul) and other means of knowledge that are not necessarily dependent upon having personally seen something firsthand (cf. 1 Peter 1:8-9). All of us believe in people, places, and events that we never have seen personally, yet that does not diminish their factuality. Nor does the absence of “sight” weaken the faith routinely produced via credible testimony from people of the past who did witness such things. Truly, one may “walk by faith, not by sight,” and still possess knowledge-based faith.

One thing is for sure: the Bible nowhere discusses or recognizes the legitimacy of any concept such as a “leap of faith.”

REFERENCES

Kung, Hans (1980), Does God Exist? (New York: Doubleday).
Schuller, Robert (1984), “The Hour of Prayer,” February 5.

A Higher Law by Dave Miller, Ph.D.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=2687

A Higher Law

by Dave Miller, Ph.D.


Concomitant with the decline of the American Republic with its inherent Christian connections, has been the infiltration of various segments of society, education foremost among them, by alternative philosophies and ideologies. Indeed, though once considered unthinkable, atheism and evolution have now achieved respectability within academia. The implications of these false systems of belief are sinister and destructive to civil (i.e., Christian) society. As French existentialist philosopher, Jean Paul Sartre, openly acknowledged:
Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself.... Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commandsthat could legitimize our behavior (1961, p. 485, emp. added).
Or, to put it in the words of prominent evolutionist, Richard Dawkins:
I am not advocating a morality based on evolution. I am saying how things have evolved. I am not saying how we humans morally ought to behave.... My own feeling is that a human society based simply on the gene’s law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. But unfortunately, however much we may deplore something, it does not stop it being true (1989, pp. 2,3, emp. added).
So if atheism, and its sinister protégé, evolution, are true, no higher standard for human behavior exists than human opinion, genetic tendency, and subjective inclination—animalistic impulse.
But such thinking is utter nonsense. No sane evolutionist would want to live in a society where the behavioral implications of his theory are enacted on a thoroughgoing, widespread scale. Yet, atheists and evolutionists continue their propaganda campaign to eradicate Christian principles from civilization. Tragically, the gradual encroachment of atheistic morality is evident in American society. Not only have crime statistics exploded since the systematic elimination of God and Christianity from public schools commenced in the 1960s, many immoral behaviors are openly, blatantly vying for legal and social sanction—from same-sex marriage, polygamy, and abortion to gambling, suicide, and a host of other evils.
No atheist or evolutionist desires to embrace the logical outcome of his godless philosophy. He seeks to distance himself from those moments in history where atheistic ideology has managed to assert itself over a society. One stark example is seen in the rise of the Nazis and their Third Reich in 1930s Germany. Their agenda included the persecution and elimination of Christian and Jewish elements of society. When their regime came crashing down and they were called before the world’s tribunal, one of their attempts to justify themselves was that they were merely obeying the law of the land. They insisted that they all had to obey Hitler’s orders, which had the force of law in the German state, and, hence, obedience could not be made the basis of a criminal charge. Dr. Stahmer, the defense attorney for Hitler’s “Successor Designate No. 1,” Hermann Goering, articulated the point on July 4, 1946 at the Nuremburg Trials in Nuremburg, Germany:
From whence will they [the victorious Allies—DM] take the standard by which to decide about justice and injustice in a legal sense? In so far as such standards exist by International Law, valid up to now, further statements are not required. That a special court for the trial was created by the Charter of this Tribunal I also do not object to. I must, however, vigorously protest against its use, in so far as it is meant to create a new material law by threatening punishment for crimes which, at the time of their perpetration, at least as far as individuals are concerned, did not carry any punishment.... Can one expect that hereafter punishment will be recognized as just, if the culprit was never aware of it, because at the time he was not threatened with such punishment, and he believed to be able to derive the authorisation for his way of acting solely from the political aims pursued?... Because internationally recognized standards outside the positive International Law by which the legitimacy of States and of their aims could have been judged did not exist, any more than did an international community as such. Slogans about the legitimacy of one’s own and of the illegitimacy of foreign aspirations served only the formation of political fronts just as the efforts to brand political adversaries as disturbers of the peace. In any case they did, indeed, not create law (The Trial of..., 1946b, 18:106-107, emp. added).
In his final argument, Dr. Stahmer further asserted that Germany was operating under a dictator: “A dictator does not enter into a conspiracy with followers, he does not make any agreement with them, he dictates” (1946b, 18:111). Hitler was the law of Germany. Hence, what right did America, Britain, or Russia (the Allied powers) have to call the Nazis to account for their actions? What standard of behavior, what law code, could possibly justify their condemnation of the Nazis? How could Nazis be judged on the basis of American, British, or Russian law, seeing they were Germans—not Americans, British, or Russians? Atheists, humanists, materialists, and evolutionists can offer no legitimate answer to these questions. The very nature of their viewpoint militates against the existence of objective, absolute morality. Indeed, to the evolutionist, morality can be nothing more than a function of the human mind—an expression of personal taste, likes, and dislikes.
U.S. Supreme Court justice, and U.S. Chief of Counsel for the prosecution (Chief Prosecutor) of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, made the following observation in his opening remarks on November 21, 1945: “The Charter of this Tribunal evidences a faith that the law is not only to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are, as Lord Chief Justice Coke [said] to King James, ‘under God and the law’” (The Trial of..., 1946a, 1:78, emp. added). Similarly, on July 27, 1946, Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, asserted the fundamental basis for human behavior: “Ultimately the rights of men, made as all men are made in the image of God, are fundamental” (The Trial of..., 1946d, 19:470, emp. added).
On Friday, July 26, 1946, Jackson included the following comments in his closing arguments:
As a Military Tribunal, this Tribunal is a continuation of the war effort of the Allied nations. As an International Tribunal, it is not bound by the procedural and substantive refinements of our respective judicial or constitutional systems, nor will its rulings introduce precedents into any country’s internal system of civil justice. As an International Military Tribunal, it rises above the provincial and transient and seeks guidance not only from international law but also from the basic principles of jurisprudence which are assumptions of civilization and which long have found embodiment in the codes of all nations (The Trial of..., 1946c, 19:383, July 26, emp. added).
The only legal guidance and authority that transcends international law, which is responsible for the moral assumptions of civilization as embodied in the codes of all nations, and which rises above “the provincial and transient” (geographical locale and time), is the law of God! Here is the only basis upon which human behavior may be rightly measured.
Atheists typically define morality in terms of “minimizing harm and pain,” and then insist that humans naturally possess an inherent recognition of morality—mores that have characterized human civilization throughout history. But this vague, ambiguous attempt to evade the existence of objectivemorality will not do. World-renowned atheist, Antony Flew, attempted this sleight of hand in his debate with Thomas B. Warren in 1976, when he insisted that the Nazis were tried for their crimes on the basis of “International” law (p. 248). Observe that this quibble side-steps the real issue, for at least three reasons: (1) There is no such thing as “International” law, since the entire international community has never established a single law code that can be bound on all countries. Even the United Nations lacks any such law code. Nor would they ever come to an agreement on one, if they tried! (2) Even if all nations on Earth somehow united to reach consensus on right and wrong, what right would those nations’ representatives have to impose their standard of behavior on all humans? (3) And, further, even if one generation of world leaders defined right and wrong for the entire world, what would prevent the next generation of world leaders from meeting and overturning that standard? All subsequent moral frameworks and law codes would be just as legitimate as the first one—though they may differ with each other in numerous instances. In the specific case of the Nazis, if some later tribunal convened to revisit the Nuremberg verdicts, and decided to overturn those decisions and declare to the world that the Nazis’ actions were actually noble, heroic, and moral—would their action make it so? If there is no God, the atheist must answer, “Yes.”
The Founders of the American Republic insisted that human government must be established on unchanging moral principles that transcend human opinions and feelings. These unchanging moral principles are derived from and based upon the unchanging laws of God—what the Founders styled in the Declaration of Independence: “the laws of nature and of nature’s God.” As Constitution signer and U.S. Supreme Court Justice James Wilson expressed: “Human law must rest its authority ultimately upon the authority of that law which is Divine” (1804, 1:105). Or as Constitution signer Alexander Hamilton insisted: “The law...dictated by God Himself is, of course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are of any validity if contrary to this” (1961, 1:87). Noah Webster said it so well when he observed that “our citizens should early understand that the genuine source of correct republican principles is the Bible, particularly the New Testament, or the Christian religion” (1832, p. 6).
The truth is that all human behavior that conflicts with the law of God is sin (1 John 3:4)—the only moral evil. Any civilization that jettisons this objective standard of morality is committing ultimate, national suicide. That society is leaving itself open to unimaginable horror—the natural consequence that logically follows from the expulsion of God from the minds of the citizens. Atheism, if honestly applied, must inevitably result in hedonism. The psalmist certainly connected the dots:
The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt, and have done abominable iniquity; There is none who does good (Psalm 53:1).
The solution? Citizens must return to the founding principles: God exists, the Bible is the Word of God, Christianity is the one true religion, and citizens must govern themselves by Christian moral principles.

REFERENCES

Dawkins, Richard (1989), The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Hamilton, Alexander (1961), The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press).
Sartre, Jean Paul, (1961), “Existentialism and Humanism,” French Philosophers from Descartes to Sartre, ed. Leonard M. Marsak (New York: Meridian).
The Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946a), 2nd Day: Wednesday, 21st November, 1945, (Vol. 1, Part 7 of 8), (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office), http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-01/tgmwc-01-02-07.html.
The Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946b), 187th Day: Thursday, 4th July, 1946, (Vol. 18, Part 7 of 8), (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office), http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-18/tgmwc-18-171-07.shtml.
The Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946c), 187th Day: Friday, 26th July, 1946, (Vol. 19, Part 1 of 12), (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office), http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-187-01.shtml.
The Trial of German Major War Criminals (1946d), 188th Day: Saturday, 27th July, 1946, (Vol. 19, Part 8 of 8), (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office), http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-19/tgmwc-19-188-08.shtml.
Warren, Thomas and Antony Flew (1976), The Warren-Flew Debate on the Existence of God, Creation and Evolution (Ramer, TN: National Christian Press). http://www.nationalchristianpress.net/NCPcatalog.pdf.
Webster, Noah (1832), History of the United States (New Haven, CT: Durrie & Peck).
Wilson, James (1804), The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, ed. Bird Wilson (Philadelphia, PA: Lorenzo Press).

A Coherent Definition of a God by Kyle Butt, M.Div.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=1022


A Coherent Definition of a God

by Kyle Butt, M.Div.


Renowned atheistic spokesperson, Dan Barker, has been debating the existence of God for over two decades. One of his favorite assertions is that no one can coherently define God. Since, he claims, no one can define God, we should conclude that there is an extremely high probability that God does not exist. In my debate with him on God’s existence, two minutes and four seconds into his opening speech, he stated: “There’s no coherent definition of a God. How can we debate something that we can’t even define? God is defined as a spirit, but what is that?” He admitted that this argument does not disprove God, but he claimed that it makes the idea of God so unlikely and improbable that we should simply “round up” and disbelieve in God (Butt and Barker, 2009).
As with many of Barker’s other statements, his “no coherent definition” idea is simply an assertion that seems plausible only until it is critically analyzed in light of sound reasoning. First, God can be defined in such a way that brilliant men and women for thousands of years have been able to intelligently discuss God’s attributes, existence, and qualities? In fact, the vast majority of standard dictionaries give a working definition that most third-graders understand. For instance, the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary gives the following definition for “God”: 1. “the supreme or ultimate reality: as a: the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped as creator and ruler of the universe” (2009). The American Heritage Dictionary’s primary definition of “God” is: “1. God a. A being conceived as the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions” (2000, p. 753). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, a massive volume of almost 3,000 pages, defines “God” as: “the supreme or ultimate reality: the Deity variously conceived in theology, philosophy, and popular religion: as (1): the holy, infinite, and eternal spiritual reality presented in the Bible as the creator, sustainer, judge, righteous sovereign, and redeemer of the universe who acts with power in history carrying out his purpose...” (1993, p. 973).
So coherent, in fact, is the definition of God that it is absent from books such as The New York Times’ Everyday Reader’s Dictionary of Misunderstood, Misused, Mispronounced Words (1972). The term “God” is defined in every major dictionary, it is absent from the books that compile words that are difficult to understand, and the term has been used in meaningful conversation for thousands of years since the dawn of humanity. In order for a person to say that God cannot be coherently defined, he would need to change the meanings of the words “coherent” or “defined.” The fact that the term “God” is included in this article, and the reader can differentiate it from all the other concepts and terms being discussed, goes a long way to proving that the term can be meaningfully defined.
But let us dig deeper into Barker’s assertion and deal with another idea he presents. Barker has a problem with the term “spirit,” and he claims that no one knows exactly what a spirit is. Thus, he suggests, God cannot be something that no one can explain. In answer to Barker’s assertion, we could simply give another list of dictionary definitions of the word “spirit.” The Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary gives several meanings of the word, including: “1: an animating or vital principle held to give life to physical organisms” or “4: the immaterial intelligent or sentient part of a person” (2009). A lengthy list of dictionary definitions would most likely bore the reader, but it would show that the term “spirit” is used in common parlance, easily understood, and discussed.
The idea that Barker seems to be presenting, then, is not that people have a difficult time defining or discussing terms like “God” or “spirit.” Barker seems to be indicating that since everybody’s definition of a “spirit” is not identical, and since we do not know everything about a “spirit,” then the concept must be unproductive. Of course, if we eliminate all the concepts that we do not unanimously agree upon or that we do not completely understand, our discussions would be extremely limited. For instance, in Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene, Dawkins attempted to define the word “gene,” but he noted: “My definition will not be to everyone’s taste, but there is no universally agreed definition of gene” (2006, p. 28, emp. added). Charles Darwin himself, when discussing the term “species” (which term was in the title of his most famous book) wrote: “Nor shall I here discuss the various definitions which have been given of the term species. No one definition has satisfied all naturalists; yet every naturalist knows vaguely what he means when he speaks of a species” (1860, p. 38, emp. added). Quotes like these two could be multiplied and are sufficient to show that there need not be unanimous agreement about a term in order for it to have meaning.
Furthermore, it would be impossible to limit our vocabulary to concepts that are completely and fully understood. Can we use words that describe things that we do not totally understand? Indeed, not only is it permissible, but it is commonly practiced by all. For instance, in his book, The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins stated: “Nobody has yet invented the mathematics for describing the total structure and behaviour of such an object as a physicist, or even of one of his cells. What we can do is understand some of the general principles of how living things work, and why they exist at all” (1996, p. 3, emp. added). Notice that Dawkins admits that we cannot fully understand and describe a single cell, but that does not stop us from defining its generalities and using them to discuss the concept of a “cell.” In Robert Hazen’s series, Origins of Life, he has an entire lecture titled “What is Life?” In that lecture, he attempted to define the term “life,” but he noted that he had seen at least 48 definitions, “Yet, remarkably, no two definitions are the same” (2005, p. 49). He further stated: “As you can imagine, scientists crave an unambiguous definition of life. Such a definition remains elusive” (p. 50). Hazen quipped that many scientists are “loath to draw too narrow a definition [of life—KB] in our present state of ignorance” (p. 51, emp. added); “I would argue that scientists in the early 21st century are in the same boat [as those in the 18th century—KB]—no position to define life.... To summarize this lecture, there is no simple answer to the question, ‘What is life?’” (p. 58). Using Barker’s line of reasoning in light of Dr. Hazen’s lecture on life, there must be no such thing as life, since we do not have a definition upon which all scientists agree. As you can see, such a conclusion is irrational. Furthermore, Barker and the scientific community have no qualms discussing ideas such as dark matter, dark energy, and black holes, even though these concepts cannot be accurately defined.

DEFINING “SPIRIT” POSITIVELY

In the cross-examination section of our debate, Barker asked me what a spirit is. I stated that a spirit is a “non-physical, incorporeal mind.” He responded by saying, “But that doesn’t answer the question. You told us what it is not. You said it is non-corporeal, non-physical. But positively, what is a spirit?” (2009). Notice that my definition included the positive concept of a spirit being a mind. Barker conveniently focused on the words “non-physical” and “incorporeal,” but intentionally ignored the definition of spirit as a mind. Barker refuses to deal with the concept of an immaterial mind because he is a materialist. In his debate with Peter Payne, Barker stated: “We are natural creatures. The natural world is all there is” (2005). What Barker means by the term “natural” is: “composed of physical matter.” His atheistic philosophy will not allow him to admit that there is anything other than matter. This false, materialistic assumption is his fundamental problem with the term “spirit.” It has been shown extensively and definitely, however, that humans possess an immaterial, rational mind that cannot be relegated to mere physical matter (see Harrub and Thompson, 2004; Thompson and Harrub, 2004). The mere fact that you can read, comprehend, analyze, and assess Barker’s assertion proves that something immaterial is at play.
Incidentally, Barker’s assertion that negative terms cannot be used to give positive meaning to something is vacuous. In his book godless, Barker gives a lengthy definition of what he believes the term “atheism” means. He stated: “It turns out that atheism means much less than I had thought. It is merely the lack of theism. It is not a philosophy of life and it offers no value.... [T]o be an atheist, you don’t need any positive philosophy at all.... Basic atheism is not a belief” (p. 98, emp. added, italics in orig.). According to Barker, atheism can be defined in purely negative terms without offering a single positive concept, the very thing he accuses those who define “spirit” of doing.
Furthermore, in answering his question during the cross-examination, I mentioned two words, darkness and cold, that are often understood in negative terms. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines darkness as: “1 a: devoid or partially devoid of light: not receiving, reflecting, transmitting, or radiating light” (2009, emp. added). Even though “darkness” is defined in negative terms as the absence of light, there is no doubt that darkness exists.

CONCLUSION

God is the uncaused, all-powerful, all-knowing, merciful, gracious, eternal Spirit whose personality and attributes are manifested in the pages of the Bible. Virtually every dictionary gives an understandable and reasonable definition of God, books that deal with difficult words omit God, and God has been the main subject of discussion and study of the vast majority of the most brilliant thinkers for millennia. The rhetorical tactic suggesting that God cannot be defined is nothing more than an assertion based on a materialistic philosophy that is unfounded. In truth, God can be clearly defined and delineated from all other entities to such an extent that Dan Barker and I can be involved in a formal debate and both know exactly what (or rather Who) we are discussing—God, the God of the Bible.

REFERENCES

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000), (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin), fourth edition.
Barker, Dan and Peter Payne (2005), Does Ethics Require God? [On-line], URL:http://www.ffrf.org/about/bybarker/ethics_debate.php.
Barker, Dan (2008), godless (Berkeley, CA: Ulysses Press).
Butt, Kyle and Dan Barker (2009), Does the God of the Bible Exist? (Montgomery, AL: Apologetics Press).
Darwin, Charles (1860), On the Origin of Species By Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life (New York: The Modern Library), second edition.
Dawkins, Richard (1996), The Blind Watchmaker (New York: W.W. Norton).
Dawkins, Richard (2006), The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 30th Anniversary Edition.
Harrub, Brad and Bert Thompson (2004), “The Origin of the Brain and Mind—Parts 1 & 2,” [On-line], URL: http://apologeticspress.org/apPubPage.aspx?pub=1&issue=549.
Hazen, Robert (2005), Origins of Life(Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company).
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2009), [On-line], URL: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary.
The New York Times Everyday Reader’s Dictionary of Misunderstood, Misused, Mispronounced Words (1972), ed. Laurence Urdang, (New York: Weathervane Books).
Thompson, Bert and Brad Harrub (2004), “The Origin of Consciousness—Parts 1 & 2,” [On-line], URL: http://apologeticspress.org/apPubPage.aspx?pub=1&issue=552.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993), (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster).

A Christian Response to Descartes’ Radical Doubt by Caleb Colley, Ph.D.

http://apologeticspress.org/APContent.aspx?category=12&article=2790

A Christian Response to Descartes’ Radical Doubt

by Caleb Colley, Ph.D.


Modern philosophy is said to begin with René Descartes (1596-1650; Copleston, 1994, 4:1). Many think that “René Descartes is perhaps the single most important thinker of the European Enlightenment” (Hooker, 2009; cf. Copleston, 4:174ff.). Descartes is thought to be “the father of the subjective and idealistic (as was Bacon of the objective and realistic) tradition in modern philosophy,” who “began the great game of epistemology, which in [sic] Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant waxed into a Three Hundred Years’ War that at once stimulated and devastated modern philosophy” (Durant, 1926, pp. 116,117, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. p. 268). First, I will summarize the historical/philosophical context of Descartes’ work, which will provide two things: (1) An overview of his motivations, and (2) an explanation of why the Christian apologist should be prepared to counter certain of Descartes’ arguments. Second, I will examine the nature of Descartes’ doubt, which is central to his philosophy. Finally, I will offer a critique from the Christian perspective.

CONTEXT

Burnham and Fieser observed: “Descartes’ philosophy developed in the context of the key features of Renaissance and early modern philosophy. Like the humanists, he rejected religious authority in the quest for scientific and philosophical knowledge” (see Kenny, 1968, p. 4; cf. Maritain, 1944, p. 55). Descartes was a devout Catholic, but was influenced by the Reformation’s challenge to Church authority and scholastic Aristotelianism (philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle’s thought; “René...,” 2008). Specifically, he was influenced by the scientific ideas of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo Galilei (see Durant, 1926, p. 117). In 1633, the Catholic church condemned Galileo’s Dialogue because of its heliocentricity, and Descartes thought that his forthcoming work, Le Monde, would offend the church as well, so he postponed its publication (Galilei, 2001; “René...”; Fowler, 1996; Rodis-Lewis, 1992, p. 39; cf. Kenny, pp. 7-8). In fact, Descartes’ first major writing was published anonymously (see Cottingham, 1986, p.13).
In developing his rationalistic philosophy, Descartes positioned himself against scholasticism and Aristotelianism, as he explains in a letter to Voetius:
[T]he philosophy against which you rail with such violence...aims at the knowledge of the truths which are acquired by means of the natural light, and which promise the benefit of the human race; by contrast the dominant philosophy, which is taught in the schools and universities, is merely a muddled collection of opinions which are mostly open to doubts, as is proved by the debates that they occasion day after day, and which are entirely without practical benefit, as centuries of experience have proved only too well (quoted in Cottingham, p. 15; cf. Copleston, p. 174).
Descartes hoped that philosophy could be as certain as mathematics, the principles of which he saw as being exceptionally sound (1952a, 31:ix; 1952b, 31:14,31; cf. Loeb, 1992, p. 219; Rodis-Lewis, 1992, pp. 26ff.; Ree, 1975, pp. 28-34), and that his writings could replace traditional texts based on Aristotle (Ross, n.d.; cf. Cottingham, 16). “[H]e wanted to define an area in which everything could be completely explained by a reductionist, mechanistic physical science” (Ree, p. 91). “[T]he brand of knowledge Descartes seeks requires, at least, unshakably certain conviction,” and such knowledge he considered to be unavailable from authority or sense-perception (Newman, 2005). “Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects...contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable” (Descartes, 1952b, 31:77). Descartes challenged scholasticism generally because he thought that it had been convoluted by “jargon-manipulation and the juggling of authorities” as “the paramount road to academic advancement” (Cottingham, p. 5). [NOTE: The purpose of this article is not to assess scholasticism or Aristotelianism.]
Banach summarizes Descartes’ starting position: “In order to show that science rested on firm foundations and that these foundations lay in the mind and not the senses, Descartes began by bringing into doubt all the beliefs that come to us from the senses.... The obvious implication is that, since we do know that external objects exist, this knowledge cannot come to us through the senses, but through the mind” (n.d., parenthetical item in orig.). Maritain observed: “Descartes, on the contrary, who with the rest of the moderns makes science consist in invention rather than in judgment, has a hankering for a Science which with one and the same movement proves by discovering, and discovers by proving, established in complete certitude from its inception, rejecting of itself as an attempt against its being, every purely probable element” (1944, p. 55).
His method of acquiring this scientific conviction begins with doubt, which for Descartes took root in his general objection to his instructor’s methods (2007, p. 17). “[W]hen I considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be but one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable” (2007, p. 15). His doubt leads Descartes to the “insistence that philosophy should begin with the self and travel outward” (Durant, 1926, 336).
Whatever Descartes’ specific theological positions, his philosophical starting-point is dangerous to faith. Descartes’ project began by trusting in reason to the exclusion of revelation (both natural and special). This procedure is in contrast with Paul’s prescription: “For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse” (Romans 1:20). It falls to the Christian apologist to reason properly about what God has revealed (see Warren, 1982), and to defend the faith against the attacks of doubt. God expects us to use our senses as we come to a knowledge of Him (1 John 1:1-3), so we must critically analyze any approach to knowledge that attempts an overthrow of empiricism. As Wilson noted, Descartes had “a general metaphysical vision of reality, and commitments to a special conception of what the world is like and how it works” (1978, p. 221). We must ask whether that metaphysical vision is consistent with Christianity.

CARTESIAN DOUBT

From the foregoing, it is obvious that Descartes became a rationalist. Generally speaking, a rationalist “accepts the supremacy of reason, and aims at establishing a system of philosophy and ethics independent of arbitrary assumptions and authority” (“FAQs,” n.d.). Descartes summarized his rationalist perspective: “[I]t is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone” (2007, p. 88). Descartes sought “an absolute foundation for knowledge by proposing to doubt all things and accept as knowledge (or at least as a foundation for knowledge) only what could not be doubted” (Cannon, 2001, parenthetical item in orig.). For Descartes, this narrowed the field of possible knowledge, leaving only that of which “the light of reason” or “the light of nature” provide assurance (see Markie, 1992, p. 147; cf. Maritain, 1944, pp. 50, 115):
I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable. Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms (pieces of false reasoning)...I, convinced that I was open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations (2007, p. 31, parenthetical item added).
Descartes had been troubled by the recognition that his senses deceived him on occasion. For example, “I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true” (2007, p. 31, parenthetical item in orig.; cf. pp. 76-77; cf. Wilson, 1978, pp. 17ff.). Furthermore, “Descartes cannot yet be certain if there are any bodies in existence. Since one cannot ‘sense’ unless there is body present (otherwise it is a dream or a hallucination or a mirage or an illusion)” (Mahon, n.d., parenthetical item in orig.). In examining why his senses deceived him, Descartes proposed the possibility of a deceptive demon. “[S]ome malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by which this being has laid snares for my credulity” (2007, pp. 78-79).
Descartes had disregarded empirical knowledge entirely (see 2007, p. 79), and settled on the one reality that, he believed, satisfied his radical criterion for truth:
But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search (p. 31, parenthetical item and emp. in orig.).
Descartes focused on the one thing he believed is certain: that he is a “thinking thing” (2007, p. 84). He explained his rationale further in his Principles: “[W]hile rejecting in this way all those things which we can somehow doubt, and even imagining them to be false, we can indeed easily suppose that there is no God, no heaven, no material bodies; and even that we ourselves have no hands, or feet, in short, no body; yet we do not on that account suppose that we, who are thinking such things, are nothing” (p. 5). Cottingham observed: “The most striking feature about the accounts Descartes himself gives of the Cogito argument is that the certainty involved stems from the fact that the mediator has pushed his doubt to the limit.... [T]he very fact that I am around to entertain the doubt shows that I must exist” (p. 38).
Next, Descartes needed to develop a “permanent system of knowledge” from his theory of doubt (see Cottingham, p. 42). Wilson explained: “The upshot of the argument of the Meditations is that an external physical world can be proved to exist, thus in a sense affirming what everyone ‘knew’ all along; but the proof turns out to be arduous and to require immaterialist premises: people are wrong in thinking the direct evidence of the senses is sufficient” (p. 45). In this process of rebuilding the knowledge he previously deconstructed via radical doubt, Descartes reintroduced God. This move was essential to Descartes’ conviction that material objects exist:
Is there not a God...who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them? ... And in truth, as I have no ground for believing that Deity is deceitful, and as, indeed, I have not even considered the reasons by which the existence of a Deity of any kind is established, the ground of doubt that rests only on this supposition is very slight, and, so to speak, metaphysical (2007, pp. 81,90).
Descartes insisted that of all his perceptions of external objects, including his own body, the notion of God “has certainly in it more objective reality than those ideas by which finite substances are represented,” and that the effects of his perceptions must have correlative causes (2007, pp. 92-93). “And how could the cause communicate to it this reality unless it possessed it in itself? And hence it follows...that the more perfect, in other words, that which contains in itself more reality, cannot be the effect of the less perfect” (p. 93). Since Descartes clearly had an idea of God in his consciousness, and since he believed himself incapable of originating this idea independent of some exterior force on his intellect, then he concluded that that Being caused the idea (see pp. 94-97).
I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite.... The idea, I say, of a being supremely perfect, and infinite, is in the highest degree true; for although, perhaps, we may imagine that such a being does not exist, we cannot, nevertheless, suppose that his idea represents nothing real, as I have already said of the idea of cold. It is likewise clear and distinct in the highest degree, since whatever the mind clearly and distinctly conceives as real or true, and as implying any perfection, is contained entire in this idea (pp. 96,97).
Hence Descartes did away with the demon, concluding that it is impossible for God, being perfect, to deceive him (p. 103). “[H]e is no deceiver...” (p. 115).
Having reached a conviction that God is real, Descartes proceeded to claim partial knowledge of material objects by virtue of God’s grace:
I cannot deny that we may have produced many other objects, or at least that he is able to produce them, so that I may occupy a place in the relation of a part to the great whole of his creatures.... And although there are perhaps innumerable objects in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding, it cannot, on that account be said that I am deprived of those ideas as of something that is due to my nature, but simply that I do not possess them, because, in truth, there is no ground to prove that Deity ought to have endowed me with a larger faculty of cognition than he has actually bestowed upon me (p. 105; cf. pp.112-113).
On Descartes’ account, humans can be certain that they possess knowledge only because God exists and can be trusted not to deceive.

CRITIQUE

Consider three problems with Descartes’ approach to knowledge: First, “Insistence upon a standard of absolute certainty eliminates the middle ground of reasonable evidence. It suggests that if you don’t have complete certainty you have no evidence at all” (Cannon, 2001). Anthony Kenny summarizes this objection: “Few would quarrel with the starting point: it is true that we grow up uncritically accepting many beliefs which may be false. But is it necessary, in order to rectify this, that we should on some occasion call in question all our beliefs? Can we not correct them piecemeal?” (p. 18). If, for example, when I strike my fist against a wall, I have an insufficient level of certainty that the wall is real, then what level of certainty is needed? Human beings necessarily operate on a level of faith in their senses, but that faith is biblical (as we will see), and certainly sufficient for human existence.
Kant points out that the Cogito falls short of proving Descartes’ point, because it also is an empirical notion: “The ‘I think’ is...an empirical proposition, and contains the expression, ‘I exist.’ But I cannot say ‘Everything, which thinks, exists;’ for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary beings. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition ‘I think,’ as Descartes maintained” (2003, p. 225). Also, Kenny raises the question of identity: “Is not Descartes rash in christening the substance in which the doubts of the Meditations inhere ‘ego’? To be sure, he explains that he is not yet committing himself to any doctrine about the nature of the ego.... But what ‘I’ refers to must at least be distinct from what ‘you’ refers to; otherwise the argument might as well run ‘cogitatur, ergo es’ (“thought exists, therefore, you are”) as ‘cogito ergo sum’ (“I think, therefore I am)” (1968, p. 62, parenthetical items added).
Second, “Insistence upon absolute clarity and distinctness to the skeptical reflecting mind eliminates consideration of any respect in which reality transcends full and determinate representation” (Cannon). Indeed, the very fact that Descartes knew that his senses occasionally “deceived” him, demonstrates that his senses usually (typically) provided him with accurate perceptions. The Bible teaches that we generally can place confidence in our senses, even to the degree of sinning, recognizing the need for salvation, and accessing remission of sins (e.g., Genesis 13:15; Matthew 5:13; Acts 13:44; John 20:24-30; etc.). Descartes’ argument is intelligible only if the illusive nature of dreams, for example, does not inhibit our general understanding of reality. Kant, therefore, emphasizes the need for “sensuous phenomena” in the “empirical world” while recognizing its limitations—even if they are God-given (2003, pp. 42,43,316; 1952, 42:337). In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes would seem to agree: “I have no reason...to think that it was obligatory on [God] to give to each of his works all the perfections he is able to bestow upon some” (2007, p. 105).
In this context, it is remarkable that Descartes moves swiftly from doubting his senses, to relying on them (and problematically placing the seat of empirical knowledge in the pineal gland; see Lockhorst, 2008; cf. Kenny, pp. 225-226):
And as I observed that in the words “I think, therefore I am,” there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive (2007, p. 32).
Perhaps this occurs because Descartes did not wish to be separated from the reality he knew prior to settling on the Cogito: “Proposing to rebuild one’s knowledge from the ground up because a number of things that once seemed true have become doubtful or false, as Descartes does, is a lot like being in a boat out on the ocean and proposing to abandon ship in order to rebuild the boat from the keel up just because it has developed a few leaks” (Cannon).
Third, Descartes did not provide a convincing reason for his rejection of the possibility that a demon was placing false ideas in his consciousness. Because all of Descartes’ evidence was rational, and none of it was empirical, his basis for thinking that God exists was a “clear and distinct” idea of a Person, “infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful” (2007, pp. 96,97). Why could that idea not have been placed in Descartes’ mind by a god who is actually deceitful? Descartes finished where he started, but not prior to attempting an overthrow of empiricism. His pre-existing belief in God rescued Descartes from his own personal skepticism; but what of those readers who find his argument for the existence of God unconvincing? The truth is that God appeals to us by presenting us with biblical and extra-biblical evidence that agrees with our observation and rationality, all of which ultimately are derived from Him (Jeremiah 51:15).

CONCLUSION

Descartes’ radical doubt, which would entail dispensing with all epistemological knowledge, also would place an insurmountable roadblock to biblical faith. However, his doubt has been shown to be invalid. It is telling that rationalists still maintain a certain scientific epistemology (“FAQs,” n.d.). Perhaps we can hypothesize, with Maritain, that pride ultimately led Descartes to his radical doubt (pp. 33-62):
The pride of human knowledge appears thus as the very substance, solid and resistant, of rationalist hopes. Pride, a dense pride without frivolity or distraction, as stable as virtue, as vast a geometric extension, bitter and restless as the ocean, takes possession of Descartes to such an extent that it would seem the universal form of his interior workings and the principle of all his suffering (p. 56).
This is a stark contrast to Christ’s portrait of those who are pleasing to Him: “Whoever humbles himself as this little child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 18:15).
In light of Descartes’ major contributions to modern science and mathematics, it is remarkable that his doubt also led him to a radical distinction between mind and body, which we will not detail or critique here (it has been done elsewhere: see Hatfield, 1992, pp. 335-370; Kenny, 1968, pp. 216-226; Wilson, 1978, pp. 50-99). Ree summarized the necessity for this dualism: “[H]is dualism of mental and physical properties implied that since human beings had minds, they were more than mere parts of an all-engulfing physical universe” (p. 100). The connection between Descartes’ epistemology and his physiology, in light of the biblical doctrine of mind and body, would be the next logical step in this inquiry. [NOTE: Special thanks to Michael R. Young, Ph.D., for help with research.]

REFERENCES

Banach, David (n.d.), “Important Arguments from Descartes’ Meditations,” Anselm University, [On-line], URL: http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/dcarg.htm.
Burnham, Douglas and James Fieser (2006), “René Descartes,” University of Tennessee at Martin, [On-line], URL: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/descarte.htm.
Cannon, Dale (2001), “Descartes,” Western Oregon University, [On-line], URL:http://www.wou.edu/las/humanities/cannon/descartes.htm.
Copleston, Frederick (1994), A History of Philosophy (New York: Doubleday).
Cottingham, John (1986), Descartes (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell).
Descartes, René (1952a reprint), Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, ed. Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago).
Descartes, René (1952b reprint), Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, ed. Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago).
Descartes, René (1983 reprint), Principles of Philosophy, trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (Boston, MA: D. Reidel).
Descartes, René (2007 reprint), Discourse on Method/Meditations on First Philosophy (Illinois: Barnes & Noble).
Durant, Will (1926), The Story of Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster).
“FAQs” (n.d.), Rationalist Society of Australia, [On-line], URL:http://www.rationalist.com.au/faqs.htm.
Fowler, Michael (1996), “Life of Galileo,” University of Virginia, [On-line], URL:http://galileo.phys.virginia.edu/classes/109N/lectures/gal_life.htm.
Galilei, Galileo (2001 reprint), Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (New York: Modern Library).
Hatfield, Gary (1992), “Descartes’ Physiology and Its Relation to His Psychology,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University).
Hooker, Richard (2009), “The European Enlightenment: René Descartes,” Washington State University, [On-line], URL: http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/ENLIGHT/DESCARTE.HTM.
Kant, Immanuel (1952 reprint), Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, ed. Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1952).
Kant, Immanuel (2003 reprint), Critique of Pure Reason (Mineola, NY: Dover).
Kenny, Anthony (1968), Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random House).
Lockhorst, Gert-Jan (2008), “Descartes and the Pineal Gland,” Stanford University, [On-line], URL:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/#2.
Loeb, Louis E. (1992), “The Cartesian Circle,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press).
Mahon, James (n.d.), “Meditation II,” Washington and Lee University, [On-line], URL:http://home.wlu.edu/~mahonj/Descartes.M1.Mind.htm.
Maritain, Jaques (1944), The Dream of Descartes, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library).
Markie, Peter (1992), “The Cogito and Its Importance,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University).
Newman, Lex (2005), “Descartes’ Epistemology,” Stanford University, [On-line], URL:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/.
Ree, Jonathan (1975), Descartes (New York: Pica).
“René Descartes (1596-1650)” (2008), The European Graduate School, [On-line], URL:http://www.egs.edu/resources/descartes.html.
Rodis-Lewis, Genevieve (1992), “Descartes’ Life and the Development of His Philosophy,” The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University).
Ross, George Macdonald (n.d.), “Descartes Texts,” University of Leeds, [On-line], URL:http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GMR/hmp/texts/modern/descartes/dcintro.html.
Warren, Thomas B. (1982), Logic and the Bible (Ramer, TN: National Christian Press).
Wilson, Margaret Dauler (1978), Descartes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).